Cloutier v. Langlois, 1990 1 S.C.R. 158

Pierre Cloutier, a Montreal lawyer, was stopped in his vehicle by two police officers who observed him committing a traffic infraction. Upon learning that Mr. Cloutier was subject to a Warrant of Committal in Municipal Court for unpaid traffic fines, the officers arrested him and performed a “frisk” search in public view before taking him into custody. Continue reading

Leave a Comment

Filed under Section 8: Search & Seizure

Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927

Irwin Toy Ltd.’s challenge of a Quebec law prohibiting advertising targeted at children under thirteen years of age led the Supreme Court of Canada to an extensive analysis of the meaning of freedom of expression, and what limits on expression can be tolerated in a free and democratic society. Continue reading

Leave a Comment

Filed under Section 2: Fundamental Freedoms, Section 2(b): Freedom of Expression

Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143

Mark David Andrews, a lawyer resident in British Columbia was refused membership in the provincial Law Society on the grounds that he was a British subject and lacked Canadian citizenship. Continue reading

Leave a Comment

Filed under Section 15: Equality Rights

Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 265

On February 15, 1984, a group of Quebec retailers challenged provincial legislation prohibiting the use of English advertising on outdoor signs. The case made it all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada and pitted Quebec’s regional objective of preserving French culture against the fundamental freedom of expression protected by Section 2(b) of the Charter. Continue reading

Leave a Comment

Filed under Section 2: Fundamental Freedoms, Section 2(b): Freedom of Expression

R. v. Mack, [1988] 2 SCR 903

In R. v. Mack, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of entrapment, which had previously been considered by a divided court six years earlier in Amato v. The Queen. Continue reading

Leave a Comment

Filed under Section 24: Enforcement of Rights, Section 7: Life, Liberty, & Security of the Person

R. v. Rowbotham, 1988 CanLII 147 (ON CA)

In R. v. Rowbotham, ten Appellants challenged various convictions of conspiracy to import marijuana and hashish. Numerous grounds of appeal were argued, but what makes this a key case in Charter jurisprudence is the ground pursued by George and Laura Kononow, two unrepresented accused who argued that a lawyer should have been provided for them in order to protect their right to a fair trial. Continue reading

Leave a Comment

Filed under Section 11: Legal Rights, Section 11(d): Presumption of Innocence, Section 7: Life, Liberty, & Security of the Person

R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30

Dr. Morgentaler and his co-defendants operated an abortion clinic which had provided abortion services contrary to Criminal Code provisions requiring a panel of doctors to certify abortions as “therapeutic” in order to be legal. Continue reading

Leave a Comment

Filed under Section 7: Life, Liberty, & Security of the Person

R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 SCR 541

In R. v. Wigglesworth, the Appellant was a police officer who had been charged with Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act for choking and slapping a detained person, and later charted under the Criminal Code for common assault towards the same detained individual. He challenged this charge as being double jeopardy, contrary to Section 11(h) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Continue reading

Leave a Comment

Filed under Section 11(h): Double Jeopardy

R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265

In this case, Canada’s highest court considered Section 8 of the Charter (which protects against unreasonable search and seizure) and wrestled with limits on the admissibility of evidence. Continue reading

2 Comments

Filed under Section 8: Search & Seizure

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103

In R. v. Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a Court of Appeal decision striking down a clause of the Narcotic Control Act which presumed that an individual in possession of drugs had the intent to traffic. This reverse onus, the Court ruled, was contrary to the presumption of innocence in Section 11(d) of the Charter, and was not a reasonable limit on the legal rights of the accused and therefore could not be saved by Section 1. Continue reading

Leave a Comment

Filed under Section 1: Reasonable Limits, Section 11: Legal Rights, Section 11(d): Presumption of Innocence